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Adam Smith was a moral philosopher. His economic and legal thought can’t be separa-
ted from his moral psychology which frames his anthropological and social proposal.
Experimental Newtonian methodology and Hume’s empirism feed his approximation to
the reality of human being. In this new context the traditional categories of society are
defined and combined in a new way. In this paper I try to argue that the assumed opti-
mism which sometimes is attributed to Smith about the proper functioning of a commer-
cial society, it isn’t so clear if we pay attention to his vision of human being from the
experimental methodology which he uses. In addition, the hard-working man, once
embarked in commercial society, experiences that the division of labor undermines his
intellectual and moral capacities. The whole leads me to check his idea of work and to try
to think an alternative solution to the questions that he poses. 
Keywords: Adam Smith, Empirism, Moral Judgment, Virtue, Commercial Society,
Work. 
Adam Smith se consideraba a sí mismo un filósofo moral. Su doctrina económica y jurí-
dica no se puede apartar de la psicología moral que enmarca su propuesta antropológica
y societaria. La metodología experimental newtoniana y la epistemología humeana ali-
mentan su acercamiento a la realidad del hombre. Desde ahí las categorías tradicionales
de la sociedad quedan definidas y articuladas de un modo nuevo. En este artículo se pre-
tende argumentar que el supuesto optimismo que a veces se atribuye a Smith acerca del
buen funcionamiento de la sociedad comercial, no está tan justificado atendiendo a su
visión del hombre desde la metodología experimental que emplea. Además, una vez
embarcado en la sociedad comercial, el hombre trabajador experimenta que la división
del trabajo mina sus capacidades intelectuales y morales. Todo ello me lleva a revisar la
noción de trabajo que se desprende de su pensamiento y a ensayar una posible solución
alternativa a la luz de los problemas que plantea. 
Palabras clave: Adam Smith, Epistemología, Juicio moral, Virtud, Sociedad comercial,
Trabajo.
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Introduction
Although Adam Smith’s name is usually cited in discussions about
economics, Smith regarded himself as a moral philosopher.
Economics was only one of the topics he felt compelled to respond
to as a moral thinker. The moral encompasses two fields: ethics and
jurisprudence. Smith addressed ethics in Theory of Moral Sentiments,
and explored the law, finance, government, etc., in Lectures of
Jurisprudence and Wealth of Nations. His position on economics can-
not be separated from his reflections on moral psychology; the latter
is the primary and most refined framework in which the former may
be understood.
Given that Smith himself regarded his different works as parts of a
single, wider philosophical project, only a reading of the works as a
whole discloses a true picture of Smith’s thought. This methodolo-
gical approach lays the groundwork for a wide-ranging response to
the issue on which this paper centres: the anthropological bases of
Smith’s writings. Smith’s moral psychology and social project arti-
culate in new ways the fundamental categories of man’s existence in
society: economics, the law, politics, ethics and religion. In this con-
text, Smith’s very distinct idea of man ought to be taken into account
in any balanced account of his thought.
Adam Smith’s thinking has sometimes been characterized as a phi-
losophy of optimism and unlimited progress. My argument is that
Smith’s writings, read as a whole, present an intellectually coherent
vision which does little to endorse such anthropological optimism;
rather, Smith’s philosophy defers to a dual understanding of man
and, as a consequence, of society –a double vision that undermines
his so-called optimism. Furthermore, the starting-point for Smith’s
thought is a certain degree of anthropological pessimism –human
imperfection–, whose practical effects in experience prompt him to
revise the prevailing moral systems of his time. The purpose of his
revision was to find a moral framework congruent with human
nature as it really is –that is, as it is reflected in the behaviour of most
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human beings, of which Smith was an attentive observer. The new
moral system of propriety and sympathy is, to Smith’s mind, both
response and solution to the anthropological questions he framed on
the basis of his observation of social behaviour. Smith’s aim was to
provide a moral framework for ordinary people actively engaged in
the world, who harboured neither grand ambitions nor heroic
dreams.
Having taken into account the regularities of human nature, and
drawing on his close observation of men and societies, Smith
defined his idea of man. The nature of human being is to act, and
the most important motives for action are the many human pas-
sions. Smith sought to understand how a moral corrective might be
designed on the basis of the passions; far from being contemptible
or necessarily evil, such passions may play a vital role in social har-
mony when (and only when) they allow for the possibility of virtue.
Without some form of moral propriety, society might disintegrate,
and man along with it. Society must be preserved for the sake of
individual.
The process of anthropological observation on which Smith’s thin-
king draws led him to conclude that all men desire peace. Human
nature is marked by tendencies which facilitate man’s striving for
peace. Thus, the pre-eminent concern is how social harmony is to
be realised in practice. Smith’s response to this question (and many
pages of his writings) centre on two very significant virtues in this
regard: justice and benevolence.
Smith acknowledged the significant roles played by both politics
and religion throughout history in the shaping of social peace.
However, historical events in Europe from the second half of the
16th century onwards –the decline in religious unity, the emergence
of different forms of political absolutism– implied that neither reli-
gion nor politics (as a form of absolute power) on their own could
guarantee the longed-for social harmony. As a result, Smith takes a
different approach: the correct moral behaviour of men is the
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ground of social peace; in so far as they foment moral conduct, poli-
tics and religion play a subsidiary role. Economics is of pre-eminent
significance in Smith’s argument; given the passions and natural
liberty of each human being, economics, as part of the moral dimen-
sion, in a commercial society may facilitate the peaceful exchange
among all of the goods necessary for life. Nevertheless, Smith por-
trays most people’s minimal integrity with a realism bordering on
pessimism. Still, he realizes that society requires a judicial system
with laws that guarantee justice as objectively as possible, since jus-
tice is the necessary condition for social harmony. Smith’s approach
prompts further questions, of which he was aware and to which he
sought to provide possible answers –a project which has been inhe-
rited by those who come after him. 
I. Adam Smith’s vision of man and society
Adam Smith is perhaps one of the authors who has contributed
most to the organisation of society as we know it today. He has been
regarded by many as the father of capitalism1; and yet for Smith,
capitalism is not just an economic system, but rather a viable form
of social organization which takes account of the way that most peo-
ple behave2.
Dazzled by Newton’s physics, he took upon himself the task of wri-
ting a physics of the social world. Newton had begun, in his scien-
tific method, by observing natural phenomena, registering their
regularity, and discovering a few general laws which explained the
movement of these different phenomena3. Smith too hoped to
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observe social phenomena, notice their regularity, and discover the
few principles which might explain how people moved in their social
activities. Smith incorporates elements of Newtonian methodology
and Humean epistemology into his thought.
Reality is only knowable as a regular succession of phenomena that
are received and associated by imagination4. There are no Smithian
texts which indicate that the phenomena allow us to attain the
essences of things. None of his texts leave open the possibility of
considering an internal order or specific form capable of being
known. Rather, it is thanks to imagination’s task of representing
impressions in a regular, connected temporal sequence that we can
acquire knowledge of things from phenomena that we observe.
Thus, although it may be probable that the order which is established
by our imagination is similar to the order truly found in reality, we
cannot know reality itself5. This order is not an ontological category
found in reality, but rather an epistemological category situated at a
psychological level. Scottish empiricism inherited from Newtonian
science the notion that we can know nothing about the inner subs-
tances of things. Thus, knowledge of thing’s essences lies beyond the
horizon of that which can be investigated, unless one, leaving aside
Newton, were to attempt to make up arbitrary hypothesis. Seeking
to know without both beginning with and being confirmed by phe-
nomenal experience, but rather starting from an internal order
belonging to the things themselves, would be a pure hypothesis,
stemming from a rationalistic a priori of a Cartesian stripe, accor-
ding to which knowledge: “It does not perhaps contain a word of
truth”6. For both Newton and Smith, one can know the properties,
but not the essences, of things, based on the phenomena. Knowing
4 See Carrión, G. (2008), p. 52.
5 See Fitzgibbons, A. (1995), p. 83.
6 LRBL p. 146.
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man or human nature follows the same method: one gains access to
human-related phenomena according to a certain order and regular-
ity, which bring out the unity within the vareity of behaviors and
tendencies. 
In empirical philosophy, that which is probable is true insofar as an
explanation is confirmed a posteriori by the phenomena, and not inso-
far it is inferred by reason a priori, independently of the phenome-
na. Only by observing similar properties in different bodies can one
infer that other bodies possess those same properties. In other
words, empirical observation, and not a priori reason, is the starting
point of philosophy. Only new experiences and observations can
cause the laws, principles, or explanations of phenomena to change.
Based on Newton’s premises, every theory always remains subject to
revision. Nonetheless, the natural world’s phenomenal variety ceases
to be chaotic when studied according to Newton’s method and his
guidelines for philosophizing. Newtonian method provided the
eighteenth century with its scientific paradigm. Thus, in the future,
every science should proceed according to the method of Newtonian
experimental philosophy.
One of Smith’s principal, determinant concerns is how to make
society function as a coherent whole and a harmonious system, simi-
lar to the functioning of the natural machinery that makes up the
universe. This entails investigating what properties belong to
humans, and what principles ought to govern society so as to create
a coherence between the sequence of societal events and their
[underlying] principles. Thus, the overall social picture can engen-
der tranquility of mind, without presuming to discover the social
system’s conformity to an alleged ultimate reality, situated beyond
those social phenomena which we find more visible, familiar, and
obvious. In Smith’s case, the fact that man is considered more from
a psychological than from a spiritual viewpoint does not entail rela-
tivism or a lack of objectivity. Rather, it stems from restricting the
assessment of human action to the study of human sentimental and
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emotional conduct, which can be universally judged as objectively
correct. Due to this stressing of psychological factors, human happi-
ness is reduced to a kind of psychological tranquility. Happiness
deals with finding a source of pleasure which can be a real and attai-
nable goal for the majority.
Smith’s attempt to emulate Newtonian science in the social arena
begins with a study of human nature as related to morality. One
should begin with the observation of moral phenomena: first, senti-
ments, which follow upon every action and conduct; second, passions,
which move men to action; and, third, judgements, which men make
regarding their own actions. Life in society is what causes man,
when acting, to take into account the sentiments and judgements of
others. Were it otherwise, humans would repress their selfishness
and lower passions, and know themselves, only with difficulty; nor
would they take into account society’s judgements on their acts; all
of which is contradicted by common experience. Still, how can one
know whether human sentiments, passions, and judgements are
correct? What criteria determine whether this is the case?
It is necessary that each member of society attempt to act morally,
that is, in a correct way, a way that those with whom one lives can
approve of. In society at large, this translates into a harmony of sen-
timents and passions among the citizens that is indispensable to social
life. Only a society wherein such a harmony is found to a greater or
lesser degree can be considered to be proportionally happy. For
Smith, the ordering of phenomena found in the natural world is
synonymous with regularity and coherence; in social life, this regu-
larity and coherence is called “harmony.” The order of social life is a
harmony of sentiments and passions among those who make up
society, and the principle by virtue of which it can be constructed is
sympathy. The sympathetic bystander makes an effort to identify
himself with the sentiments of the person who is principally affec-
ted; while the protagonist makes the effort of attenuating his emo-
tions to the point at which the spectator may accompany him. This
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mutual effort carried out by the members of society morally unites
them. In order for society to function properly, this reciprocal
correspondence of sentiments is necessary. 
Sympathizing allows us to put out communication lines to others, for
no man can live in isolation. Nevertheless, sympathizing does not
mean leaving behind one’s own individuality so as to take upon one-
self that of the other, but rather bringing home to oneself the other’s
situation so as to judge it by our own faculty7. Sympathizing has an
analogous function of reciprocity: each person knows himself, in a cer-
tain way, by knowing how someone else is affected; that is, he knows
his own sentiments and passions. Without the mirror that each per-
son finds in other members of society, this principle of our nature
would have no occasion for being exercised. It suffices to pay atten-
tion to others, who are spectators of our own conduct, to discover
what approbation or disapprobation our conduct merits, since others
are always a reference point for us8; nonetheless, this is always the
second step, since the first thing that we judge is not our own con-
duct, but that of others. 
The imagination is what allows the sympathetic principle to come
into act. Moral judgement implies sympathizing, or not sympathi-
zing, with another’s sentiments; this is equivalent to approving or
not approving of another’s conduct, which in turn has as its neces-
sary condition feeling-with-the-other, bringing his objective situa-
tion before one’s own imagination. The particular feeling is objective
because it is analogously proportional; it is so, given that it is deri-
ved from a situation that is common to the protagonist and to the
spectator. The conduct following on the situation, due to its awake-
RAQUEL LÁZARO
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ning of sentiments in the protagonist, can be mediated by a judge-
ment of proportion and conformity. Such is the moral judgement.
The judgement’s objectivity is assured because man is a social being,
which means that the moral judgements formed by each individual’s
imagination can be modified when they are contrasted with the
judgements made by others. Society is effective because it can help
modify and correct moral judgements. The fact that man is a social
being has moral efficacy. There is a reciprocal influence among indi-
viduals in a given society by virtue of the sympathetic principle, in a
manner similar to that in which particles in physical space influence
each other by their mutual attraction: the judgements of some influ-
ence the judgements of others. 
Yet, how can one know whether the others’ judgement on the pro-
tagonist’s conduct is correct? Also: how can one be objective in jud-
ging, on the one hand, oneself, and, on the other, an agent and a
sufferer, since one’s sympathy seems to be split in two by taking both
situations into account? For Adam Smith, the existence of impartial
spectators and general rules gives some confidence in, though not a
complete guarantee of, the moral judgement’s objective certainty.
Moral judgements can be modified by taking new evidence into
account, i.e., further elements relevant to the judgement. The spec-
tator is the imaginary construct which represents a third party’s
impartiality of judgement. Smith insists that the spectator be well-
informed. 
The justification of moral judgements and of Smithian moral theory
is not to be found in Humean utilitarian reasoning9; nor is it rooted
in the Hobbesian view of a wicked and selfish human nature; rather,
it is based on reasoning about society. The constructing and preser-
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vation of the happiest society possible is the original reason for
moral behavior. Still, Smith holds that man acts principally due to
his passions, and most principally out of self-interest. His moral
solution seeks to find out how self-interest can be [made] virtuous.
The possibility of someone living apart from society would only be
admitted by Smith as a hypothesis, since all the facts contradict it10.
Outside of society, one would only find a complete ignorance of
man. Smith does not hold to an atomistic ontology of singular par-
ticles with essential properties. The properties and principles attri-
buted to humans as universal are based on observation of human
behavior within society; and society is always a historical phenome-
non.
The goal of human moral behavior is social order. The establis-
hment of social harmony is the necessary condition that allows one
to speak of a society that is happy, at least to some degree. Just as in
the world of physical Nature each particle and movement is ordered
in such a way that its proper functioning attains its end, likewise, to
achieve societal harmony in social life, each individual must function
morally in the right way. Man attains knowledge of the social world
in a way analogous to that in which one knows the order in the natu-
ral world: as something known after the fact. The principles found
in the natural world, most notably the principle of universal gravita-
tion, are what make the order of natural phenomena possible, an
order which we know a posteriori. Similarly, in the social sphere, it
is the principle of sympathy that principally renders the a posteriori
moral order possible.
Smith soon discovered that there were two types of people: the great
majority, the mainstream of society, who were not remarkable for
being particularly good or bad; and the rest, a small minority, who
were outstanding for their wisdom and virtue. The latter were
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moved by values such as heroism, disinterested altruism, the desire
for perfection, and they sought to acquire virtue and come to resem-
ble the divinity, because the hallmark of divinity is perfection. The
other group of people, the vast majority, were mainly moved by their
own interests, self-interest being their main driving force, and took
others into account, but not to the extent that they would put aside
their own interests or accept some kind of moral duty to take
responsibility for them, that is, do them good, rather than limiting
themselves to not harming them. This is the virtue of justice in a
negative sense. 
Smith points out that if the wise and virtuous were in the majority
in a society, there would be no need for civil government or laws,
because wisdom and virtue would make people live in a happy
society, quite free of conflicts. However, Smith considers that the
model of human being which stands out most in the social ambien-
ce is the one of the man seeking his own interests –and this is the
objective truth– which makes it relatively easy for conflicts to flare
up. The question, therefore, is this: How can we live in social har-
mony, if people are all pursuing their own interests? 
Smith’s response is clear: the passion which spurs most people’s
actions has to be used to generate harmony. That is, there has to be
an exchange of self-interest, so that people give to receive, and vice
versa. If each person give to the other what the other hopes to
receive, and each person receives what he expects from the other, we
shall no longer live in the desolate landscape that Hobbes had pro-
posed some years before: all-out war, everyone against everyone else,
because everyone is bent on seeking his own interests. Against this
vision, Smith thinks that each person should seek his or her own
interests without necessarily going to war: it is enough to look at the
other and calculate what kind of interest he or she expects from me,
and what I expect from him or her. That is the economy, this is the
social organization in a commercial society. 
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Our author asserts that this will bring about a new law in society
which is different from that proposed by Christianity. Christians are
supposed to love others as themselves, that is, without limits, and
with genuine interest and care, because this is how we are supposed
to love ourselves, and this is the means that has to be employed with
others. Smith, on the other hand, says that the new law is that of
reciprocity: love others only as they love us, that is, ‘give only to the
extent that you will receive’ The law which is derived from acting only
in humanity’s current, depraved state11, is formulated elsewhere as
follows: “As every man doth, so shall it be done to him, and the reta-
liation seems to be the great law which is dictated to us by Nature”12.
One may add that behaving thus is that which is just, i.e., that which
is essential for the existence of some social harmony. Love in its
absolute form, as unconditional and selfless, is replaced by recipro-
city in giving and receiving. 
The law of reciprocity is how a society of merchants functions, and
Smith understands that the person in the current historical state of
society is mainly this: an individual who trades with his/her material
property to reach a certain security and independence, and who pays
scant attention to the notion of spiritual property in the form of vir-
tue and wisdom.
The person –in the Smithian view– is an individual who relates to
others in an objective way, and so for him or her, others are not uni-
que beings with whom he or she can have relationships and whom
he or she can perceive dialogically in order to find out what his or
her morals duties towards them are. Instead, others are more or less
seen as possible objects for one’s own interest, and this is even more
so in a trading society with a high degree of autonomy. In the com-
mercial society men are between them anonymous.
revista1-10:revista1-07.qxd  21/01/2010  20:34  Página 156
157
Revista Empresa y Humanismo Vol. XIII, 1/10, pp. 145-184
ADAM SMITH: ANTHROPOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
This way of understanding the person and society presents a social
panorama in which what is most important is also most visible and
quantitative, as opposed to invisible and qualitative. What gives
security is material property –the fortune, the rank and the social
status-, and so civil forms of government have to be established in
order to protect the property of the rich from the poor by the appli-
cation of the law. What is important, therefore, is not so much poli-
tics, which is suspect because of corruption, since Machiavelli had
separated ethics from politics, as the legal sphere, that is, the exis-
tence of a set of laws which ensure respect for individual property.
Peace and social harmony are reduced to being understood as having
one’s own property ensured by the law, which justifies the creation
of new laws and strong power which can apply the corresponding
punishment to anyone who violates these laws.
With this world view, Smith stands midway between the heroic,
perfectionist vision of the Stoics and the Christians, and the egotism
of Hobbes. It is not a matter of being a hero, or aspiring to the virtue
which improves us as people and makes us grow, let alone aspiring
to an ideal of perfection in which man comes to be like God. In
Smith’s view, God takes care of the universe which he created, but
society is the affair of man, a man who has not been improved or
perfected or rescued from his egotism by any kind of divine aid or
by his own moral effort, a man who is like the vast majority, who
prefers to live a comfortable life, without debts, with good health,
without excessive worries, with material security, with a job and a
certain social status, that is, it is enough to have the social recogni-
tion which goes with our profession and wealth. 
Having a religion –one of the dimensions of the spiritual world as
opposed to the material one proposed by Smith– may be a consola-
tion, or even something to be recommended to ensure that society
maintains certain moral behaviour, but it is not essential for man in
society, nor is it a social category which has something to do with
peace, as was once the case with the Church. In the pre-modern age,
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the Church was the guarantor of peace, in that it dispensed the
supernatural gifts which enabled people to live in peace with their
fellows, because we have to have peace inside in order to give peace
to others outside13. On the other hand, in Smith there is no place
for categories of a supernatural order, and so the only function of
religion is to provide a certain guarantee of social morality. People
are alone with their self-interest, and these people have to build
society, which means that their self-interest will have to be managed
in such a way that it does not disturb the life of the community,
achieving a certain balance between individual interests without
entirely eliminating or overcoming them.
What are the consequences of thinking this way after years? If we
truly believe that the principal driving force of human action is the
individual’s self-interest, then we will go for individualism, for pur-
suit of individual interests of a kind that sooner or later gives rise to
mistrust, because we do not contemplate others with care and atten-
tion unless we need them or find them useful for our own ends. In
other words, rather than living well, people just survive, and rather
than achieving peace, they reach a precarious balance of interests.
The security and trust which come from the invisible spiritual
sphere, from religion and morality, are replaced by the security and
trust provided by the law, and buy the purchasing power which we
may have. Put another way, we exchange inner security deriving
from our own virtue and spirituality, for external security that
depends on our material property, and on the law, when what is
desirable would be to know what place each of us has in our life
within society, our life as relational beings. 
Although, for Smith, self-interest is not the only passion found in
humans, it is the one most powerfully at work in most of them.
Justice is the virtue which stems from the attempt to correct those
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self-interested inclinations which may concretely result in ill effects
on others. On the other hand, humans also experience the inclina-
tion to see others receive benefits by their good graces, and the virtue
which springs from this inclination is benevolence.
To positively do good to another is to act as a benefactor. Still, such
actions cannot be imposed by means of legal coercion, nor by the
threat of some punishment regulated by law: “Beneficence is always
free, it cannot be extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to
no punishment; because the mere want of beneficence tends to do
no real positive evil. It may disappoint of the good which might rea-
sonably have been expected, and upon that account it may justly
excite dislike and disapprobation: it cannot, however, provoke any
resentment which mankind will go along with14. The one who does
not perform beneficent actions fails to do a good which would have
been approved by others. If a society is characterized by beneficent
relationships among its members, thanks to which they mutually are
recipients of acts that positively promote the good mediated by love,
gratitude, friendship, and respect, such a society can be said to
“flourish and to be happy”15. Nonetheless, “Society may subsist,
though not in the most confortable state, without beneficence; but
the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it”16.
An harmonious society in a state of perfect happiness and comfort
is possible, namely, when beneficence and justice reign therein.
Harmony can also be achieved in a less comfortable and happy
society, because “but though the necessary assistance should not be
afforded from such generous and disinterested motives, though
among the different members of the society there should be no
mutual love and affection, the society, though less happy and agre-
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able, will not necessarily be disolved. Society may subsist among
different men, as among different merchants, from a sense of its uti-
lity, without any mutual love and affection”17. This model is that of
the commerce-based society described in the WN, but which was
already outlined in the TMS.
Justice is the virtue that is essential for society to prevail. Smith
observes that a society with justice alone does not subsist under the
best conditions. Despite this, it is possible that at least some harmo-
ny exist in it, the harmony that comes from the utility of the citizens’
correct behavior, which seeks to avoid limiting others’ rights. Justice,
in a negative sense, is a way of assuring the minimal18 social condi-
tions that humans need to live with their neighbors; therefore, this
virtue can be required. Precisely because justice is essential for social
life, any attack on what is just merits punishment; hence, justice is
legislated by laws which it would be impossible to apply to benefi-
cence. Smith divides what had been one single virtue in the
Thomistic tradition into two separate virtues. Formerly, justice had
two parts: on one hand, to not harm the other; on the other, to ren-
der him the good due to him. Thus, the other constituted the ground
for a positive moral obligation on my part: the moral obligation to
do good to him was not just a matter of custom. With Smith, and
for those who follow the tradition of Grotius and Pufendorf, this is
no longer the case.
In a commerce-based society, man often practices prudence: he takes
care of his own interests. He necessarily practices justice, since he
harms no one. And he practices benevolence in moderation by doing
good to his neighbours.
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II. The commercial Society19
Human history has gone through different stages: hunters, she-
pherds, farmers and commerce-based society. The manner of obtai-
ning property and the means of safeguarding it explain the passage
from one stage to the next. Humans remain the same: their actions
are based on their passions, passions which can be regulated by
moral judgement. Still, Smith knows that virtue, which is more than
mere correctness, is rare among men, and that few seek it outright,
since men are easily deceived by imagination and thus choose fortu-
ne-seeking rather than virtue as the path to attain happiness. What
happens in a commerce-based society?
According to Adam Smith, the division of labour brings about an
increase in productivity, an argument he articulates in the first chap-
ter of WN. The division of labour makes wealth available to all sec-
tors of society, even to those on the lowest rungs of the social
ladder. Thus, the poverty of many may be alleviated by the division
of labour.
The existence of a vast number of poor people was a cause of great
concern to Adam Smith and prompted his determination to find a
way of solving the problem of poverty. How might a form of wealth
accessible to all be found? To Smith’s mind, the movement of
wealth and its spread formed part of the very definition of wealth
itself. He saw the accumulation of money as a sterile activity in it
itself, which adds nothing to the comforts of living; the wealth of
nations does not consist in the amount of money moving in
commercial circles, but in the abundance of the necessities and con-
veniences of life. As Lectures on Jurisprudence makes clear, Smith
regarded accumulated riches as “opulence” –that is, an abundant and
inexpensive supply of the goods necessary for life, a wide range and
number of goods that may be easily exchanged. 
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Exchange is a tendency of human nature. Smith set himself the task
of discovering how such exchange might be carried out in a way that
made the necessities of life available to all. The division of labour
plays a vital role in this process.
Smith argued that only an advanced society, a developed state, in
which the individual cannot acquire life’s necessities by dint of his
own efforts alone, could provide the conditions in which the divi-
sion of labour becomes possible. The existence of such a society is,
in turn, dependent on two further conditions: the appropriation of
land and the accumulation of capital. Both of these conditions faci-
litate industrial growth and, as a consequence, the amount of work
available. Competence, skill and managerial wisdom put the amount
of work available within reach of the highest levels of productivity.
That the division of labour brings about an increase in productivity
may be attributed to three factors:
1. Task specialization refines the skills of workers. Repeatedly carr-
ying out the same task over and over again makes the worker more
skilful. The worker is not responsible for the job as a whole; his acti-
vity in the task assigned to him is one part of the production pro-
cess. A task carried out with greater skill, on the basis of repetition,
is a task done with greater speed. Smith’s line of argument draws on
the manufacturing process: in the context of the division of labour,
the hand, usually regarded as a non-specialized part of the human
body and as a sign of human intelligence, becomes ‘specialized’ in
function. In carrying out his task, the worker’s intelligence is not
engaged at every hand’s turn; the hand itself has become competent
in the performance of certain functions. The hand is divested of
intelligence, and become an effective and efficient tool.
2. The division of labour saves a considerable amount of time. Before
the advent of such division, the individual worker had to switch
from one task to another in the production process. With the divi-
sion of labour, each worker is focused on a single task; the time pre-
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viously wasted in switching from one task to another is saved. The
pace of the production process picks up. 
3. The division of labour prompted the invention of machines which
made the performance of certain tasks easier and faster. Once again,
time saved and an increase in production speed are key elements of
the division of labour.
Exchange or commerce, the social movement of what has been pro-
duced, follows from the increase in productivity brought about by
the division of labour: “Every workman has a great quantity of his
own work to dispose of beyond what he himself has occasion for;
and every other workman being exactly in the same situation, he is
enabled to exchange a great quantity of his own goods for a great
quantity, or, what comes to the same thing, for the price of a great
quantity of theirs”20. Each individual has an abundant supply of a
certain type of goods, which is exchanged with others so that all may
obtain what they need. In line with the normal tendency of human
nature, the individual becomes a commercial man, a process that
begins not only with the product of his work, but by offering his
work itself in exchange for a salary, by which he obtains the products
and goods that comprise life’s necessities. By the sale of his work,
the worker obtains the material means that can give him a degree of
independence in life.
In short, the division of labour makes a great amount of work avai-
lable, too great an amount to be carried out by an individual worker
alone: 
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A. one person reflects on the job as a whole; 
B. the vast majority of workers carry out the tasks of which the job is
comprised; 
C. others design and build the machines that make the production
process easier and faster; 
D. all become traders and consumers of the products and goods of
all, so that “the accommodation of a European prince does not
always so much exceed that of an industrious and frugal peasant”21. 
Given that each performs a different function within the same pro-
duction process, the division of tasks prompted more or less fluent
communication amongst workers, a development that was both
logical and necessary. Difference, or differentiation, leads either to
separation or communication; a number of 18th century writers
argued that the division of labour, as well as being a necessary deve-
lopment in the process of production, was a source of social cohe-
sion22. However, the structure of companies in 1776 was vertical and
pyramidal; ‘communications groups’, the office ‘intranet’ and ‘hori-
zontal management’ were ideas for a distant future. While the divi-
sion of labour encompasses all aspects of human work (bodily
strength, technical skill, refined intelligence, and the services offered
by traders)23, these elements are drawn together in the production
process rather than the activity of an individual; this argument holds
true for Smith’s time and in the present-day commitment to diffe-
rent types of assembly-line production.
For Smith, therefore, work is in practice a more or less mechanical
process; salaries and profits are derived from over-production and
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facilitate commerce, by which all obtain the necessities of life24; it
follows that work as an activity in itself be defined as a necessary con-
dition of subsistence and, as a consequence, that any shift from mate-
rial scarcity to abundance should prompt the question: why work? In
WN, Smith frames the issue in the following terms: labour was not
difficult to find in a time of scarcity (the year 1740, for example); in
times of abundance, however, labour was difficult to find because
people were less inclined to work. Moreover, Smith argues, men act
on instinct and passion, and there are two pre-dominant passions
among the poor: hatred of work and the desire for a quiet life. He
concludes that only in so far as the poor experience and suffer material
scarcity will they turn to work as the solution to their difficulties –rather
than theft, the other means of obtaining the necessities of life.
The natural principle of the division of labour is not wholly fulfilled
by an increase in production or productivity; it extends to encompass
commerce25 and consumption, which prompts a further question: is
the experience of lack or scarcity the sole origin of commerce and
consumption? Smith explains that the basic necessities of life26 are
finite: the human stomach is not unlimited. Nevertheless, human
intelligence is capable of inventing “infinite needs” –that is, once the
basic necessities of life have been satisfied, one may trade and con-
sume other superfluous and luxury goods, etc.
It is at this point that the vanity and extravagance of the rich may
turn the natural order of things on its head. The poor use the salary
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they earn by their work to buy what they need to live27; however, the
trade and consumption of goods that are not absolutely necessary for
life respond to a different interest: the wish to get better the own
condition in life, which is also likewise a tendency of human nature.
The individual may pursue the fulfilment of this desire by choosing
between two possible paths: the way of virtue or that of fortune.
Imagination may betray the man in general, and the poor in particu-
lar, who constitute the vast majority of people in society; in looking
to the rich, those who stand out in society because of their fortune
and position, they may draw the conclusion that to be happy is to
possess as much as the wealthy do28. Thus, in so far as the limits of
their salary allow, they may spend and consume those goods that
pique the extravagant vanity and luxury of the rich, turning away in
the process from the path of virtue.
That man seeks to live on the basis of his capital, rather than by his
work, is a conclusion that may be drawn from the discussion above;
this is a far cry from the original understanding of work, as articu-
lated in the book of Genesis. 
Only those who do not have enough capital work to obtain it; those
who have enough capital make others work to increase it, given that:
“It is the interest of every man to live as much at his ease as he can;
and if his emoluments are to be precisely the same, whether he does
or does not perform some very laborious duty, it is certainly his
interest … to neglect it altogether”29. The purpose of work, there-
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fore, is to generate capital, not to build up or serve or improve
society by conscious effort. These latter goals are only conceivable in
the context of an understanding of work that goes beyond a concern
with technical competence and a commitment to profit-making;
work, rather, that is open to the absolute and carried out in a virtu-
ous way. 
In suffering lack or scarcity, the poor are driven by need or by envy
of the capital possessed by the rich. Whatever the immediate
motive, the work carried out by the poor is a form of manual labour,
which may be more or less mechanized or facilitated by technology.
The work of the rich is management work, which is conditioned by
the two passions which most drive the wealthy: ambition and
avarice. Although they may not be aware of the fact, the work of the
poor responds directly to the needs of society. In contrast, the work
of the wealthy runs in opposition to social need: each seeks to satis-
fy his own personal interest. Nevertheless, by investing capital, the
work of the rich may be of benefit to the poor, and thus of society
as a whole.
III. Disadvantages of the division of labour
The division of labour is time-saving and produces both necessary
and superfluous goods. The question articulated by Ortega y Gasset
may be pertinent in this regard: on what should the time saved
through technical progress and task specialization be spent? The
wisest answer would appear to be that such time be spent on leisure
activities that enrich human experience and existence. However, this
is not the answer that the question receives in the commercial
society described by Adam Smith.
In his renowned work, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism,
Daniel Bell has noted that “mass man” –the man of the masses in a
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capitalist society– seeks entertainment, not culture; entertainment is
supplied as one more product for consumption30. Rather than
devote his free time to the search for fundamental and essential
truths, “mass man” seeks out the endless distraction of television and
the realities shows that –sometimes– add nothing real to his life;
indeed, they merely dull his spirit and whet his appetite for pleasure
in ways that obviate his rational nature. Hence the reason why study
–a rounded humanist and philosophical education, the reading of
books and essays, specialist courses at university, the education pro-
grammes offered to young people, adults and the elderly, the choice
of good cinema and television programming, etc.– should have such
importance in the free time that is available. Time devoted to the
sacred should also be recovered. The present-day knowledge society
has begun to take note of and respond to these needs.
Thus far, the focus has been on the advantages of the division of
labour; the most striking disadvantage will now be addressed: the
dehumanization of the worker.
Smith’s view of man and society is not a very optimistic one. A num-
ber of recent studies have reflected on this fact31. By nature, man is
driven by passions between them also self-interest and ambition,
and the moral propriety in only like a minimum moral for social har-
mony; this is especially true of the wealthy. Given that the majority
of people lack the necessary knowledge or education, this ambition
is not harmful in social terms: knowledge fires ambition; a lack of
knowledge, which is the case in general, keeps ambition in check.
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According to Smith, the interests of those who live within the limits
imposed by the reach of their salary are congruent with the interests
of society; normally, however, such people lack the education and
knowledge necessary to discern these parallel interests. They contri-
bute to the wealth of the nation by their work, but they remain una-
ware of the significance of their contribution. In contrast, the social
class that lives off the profits generated by work is detached from
general social needs. They seek to expand markets and sharpen com-
petition in order to maximize the profits they may make. In spite of
these cross purposes, society as a whole may still benefit and pro-
gress as a result of this situation: through the untrammelled ambi-
tion of a few (the rich), the vast majority may enjoy the social move-
ment of wealth in the form of merchandise, as such products beco-
me available even to those who belong to the lowest classes on the
social scale.
In Lectures on Jurisprudence, Smith holds that opulence and freedom
are the two greatest social goods; at the same time, however, he
argues that neither is compatible with the greater happiness of the
majority of people in society. In developed societies, the following
axiom is observed: the greater the freedom of the free, the greater
the slavery of the enslaved. In other words, if the division of labour
makes wealth –an abundance of life’s necessities and relatively inex-
pensive merchandise– available to the greatest possible number of
people in a society, their new-found wealth will be paid for at a cost
to their freedom. One can only be free outside the field of work,
never within it; or, at least, such freedom –a form of independence–
could be read as little more than a certain degree of material well-
being. The reason why this should be the case is that, in a system of
divided labour, the worker is nothing more than one more interloc-
king element in the production process; neither his spirit nor his
intelligence are engaged by the process of production. Without the
active role of his higher powers, it is difficult to see how the indivi-
dual might be described as truly free. The following question arises
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in this context: what purpose is there in accumulating wealth or
material well-being if the genuinely human freedom required to
appropriate to oneself, dispose of, use and enjoy it is lacking?32.
As Professor Martínez-Echevarría has pointed out, in a system
structured by the division of labour, the individual is the executor, but
not the designer, of his work. Design or planning belongs to the
moral and political fields because it defers to end purposes and
encompasses the potential to go beyond the power of the individual;
the ‘execution’ of tasks, on the other hand, “appears to be related to
strength and to what has been established in advance; it is deter-
mined by technical ability, and cannot extend beyond the individual
who carries it out”33. The radical separation of execution from
design means that the worker can do nothing to improve the plan he
follows in his work: the design is a given34. Given that the design
cannot be refined and the worker has no reason to engage his inte-
lligence in the task entrusted to him, no unfinished task may be
improved; rather, there is only a final product in relation to which
the role of the worker is merely one more part in the machinery of
production. 
Smith himself was aware of the consequences for the worker of task
specialization brought about by the division of labour: “The man
whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of
which the effects are perhaps always the same, or very nearly the
same, has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his
invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which
never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion,
and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a
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human creature to become”35. In the type of system that Smith des-
cribes, the skills required for a particular task are acquired at the
expense of intellectual, social and martial virtues, as specialization
also erodes the courage of the human spirit and its heroic potential.
Smith suggests that the State take steps to attenuate this risk. In the
Lectures on Jurisprudence he notes that human potential is impoveris-
hed by the spirit of commerce; it makes man incapable of going
beyond himself, narrowing his perspective and the span of his atten-
tion; thus, he concludes, the remedy of these deficiencies is an issue
worthy of serious reflection. To Smith’s mind, the provision of this
remedy is the responsibility of the State; given that no-one is prepa-
red to invest in something that will not return a profit in material
terms, the State is responsible for the education of its citizens36.
The State should provide basic education. Nevertheless, people have
relatively little free time to dedicate to education: parents work to
support their children, and as soon as they are mature, the children,
in turn, look for work that makes little or no demand on their inte-
lligence; moreover, “at the same time, their labour is both so cons-
tant and so severe, that it leaves them little leisure and less inclina-
tion to apply to, or even to think of, anything else”37.
Another approach to remedying the inadequate education of the
poor would be to instil in them a set of religious principles, which
would also ground the moral principles that make peaceful social co-
existence possible. Smith’s view is that religion prepares people for
the next life, whereas his interest lies in this world; his admiration
for ancient moral philosophy derives from its concern with the edu-
cation of good citizens. Both TMS and WN address this issue: how
to ensure that the greatest possible number of people may survive
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and live well in society, in spite of the fact that the vast majority are
lacking in virtue, wisdom and wealth, and yet must still learn to be
good citizens.
In their free time, most people do not engage in activities that enrich
the spirit; rather, they distract themselves through different forms of
entertainment. Only the few, says Smith, cultivate reason.
The problem that Smith touches on is –in the terms used by Simone
Weil– that man has become alienated from his work. The task(s) he
performs do not have a conscious influence on his personal and exis-
tential development. Human work has no contemplative dimension;
it has been divested of the human spirit. Moreover, the service and
social contribution that the individual provides through his work are
reduced to the generation of profits capable of satisfying his own
self-interest.
Smith pays scant attention to the subjective dimension of work
–that is, the human dignity of the worker and the idea of work as a
form of service. His argument centres on the most material aspects
of work, but the “spiritual poverty” of work seen from the perspec-
tive of the individual worker is a question left unanswered. In any
case, the basic principles that Smith holds to limit any comprehen-
sive or innovative theory of work. If man’s primary motive for action
is to satisfy his own self-interest, conditioned to a greater or lesser
degree by ambition, little room remains for concern for others,
which may be regarded as the primary purpose of education. It is far
more difficult to educate than it is to distract and entertain. The
benevolence is scarce.
If the poor have no higher aspiration than to imitate the rich in
terms of material possessions, then no complete solution to the
problem of wealth or poverty may be found. Authentic self-develop-
ment and improvement must encompass both dimensions: the spi-
ritual and the material. Spiritual improvement is synonymous with
virtue and a level of education that goes beyond basic knowledge and
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skills. On the basis of the principles deferred to by Adam Smith,
however, virtue and education38 are incompatible with one another
in the lives of most men. 
IV. Reconciling work and virtue
Smith had a keen awareness of the difficulties outlined above; hence,
perhaps, his intellectual affection for agricultural societies, rather
than large commercial towns. A commitment to saving and relati-
vely low earnings –in a word, frugality– are the characteristic values
of agriculture. Agriculture does not allow for the division of labour
into specific tasks to the same degree as the manufacturing industry
does. Moreover, agricultural capital is a more immediate personal
possession; he who tills the land is independent of the rest of the
world, he is his own lord and master. In fact, Smith argues that, if
human institutions had not tampered with the natural order of
things, the most stable mode of development and progressive
growth in wealth, at no real cost to one’s freedom, would be “the
cultivation and improvement of [its] lands”39. Social order is a func-
tion of the positions adopted by the people who constitute it: the
ambition of the rich, their preference for the superfluous products
and luxuries that may be bought through external commerce over
the low earnings and savings that characterize life in the countryside,
subvert that order40. A significant question arises in this context:
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might the human tendency to covet material abundance be chan-
nelled into a passion for spiritual perfection?
In Meditación de la Técnica, referred to above, Ortega y Gasset holds
that the individual seeks to satisfy life’s necessities in order to be free
of them, free to focus his efforts on what is truly important in life.
There are certain primary and basic needs that must be met.
Technical skills and scientific knowledge are paramount in this con-
text; they are not, however, fundamental in an absolute sense, just as
the needs they serve are not absolutely fundamental in themselves
but the conditions that make the satisfaction of higher needs and
interests possible. At the same time, given that man is a unity of
body and spirit, such skills and knowledge also have a spiritual
dimension. 
Action is the essence of every living being; if he were to do nothing,
man could not be said to be fully human. Work is the activity that
gives shape to his life. All types of work nowadays require the use of
some technical skills and a certain degree of practical knowledge, but
what might this situation imply? “The demands of a specific task are
reduced to a certain extent by the use of [a technical skill or prac-
tice]… the desire to save effort at work prompts further technical
enquiry… The issue is not one of remote interest; it pertains to the
essence of the technical method itself, which cannot be wholly
understood if analysis stops short at the idea of saving effort and fails
to ask to what the effort thus saved might then be turned”41. While
physical strength is part of the natural order of things, the powers of
intellect and will are the determining features of human being; thus,
the time and effort saved by means of the use of technical skills must
be understood as saved for the purposes of devoting more time and
effort to specifically human activity: to shape the project of our lives,
which is not alien to the project of our working lives. The first point is
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Ortega’s; the second, Grimaldi’s: together they constitute the most
fundamental need of human life.
The Spanish philosopher wrote that: “For man, to exist means more
than to exist as the man he is; rather, to exist refers only to the
possibility of existence and the struggle to shape it… Unlike all
other living beings, therefore, the existence of man is the effort to
shape his existence… Hence the view of human life as endless work,
a series of tasks that may not be shirked”42. Each individual must
shape “the narrative of his own life”43. Self-determination is a subs-
tantial feature of personal existence. Grimaldi rounds out this pers-
pective by adding that the narrative of personal life encompasses
work since all work is formative44; the best of human life and the his-
tory of personal existence is reflected in work; the finest narrative of
existence is forged in the workplace.
Certain types of work –the repetitive and mechanical– undermine
the meaning and value of personal life. Time becomes cyclical, cir-
cling endlessly in the eternal present of repetition; nothing seems
new, and the startling contingency of the future, which prompts
correction and new plans based on past action, is wholly absent.
Some kinds of mechanical work dull the human spirit, and may even
crush it. They may also call into question the self-determination that
lies at the heart of personal existence: the life of a crushed spirit, a
spirit that is not actively present, is either pure repetition and bore-
dom45 –time passes and nothing ever happens; or pure dissipation,
in which the passions respond to every different external stimulus
and man distracts himself through a variety of activities that offer
him no sense of unity. In both cases, man is stripped of his spirit,
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loses control of his actions, and wastes his time and his life.
Repetitive and mechanical work denatures human life: such work is
not human. As Simone Weil pointed out46, the activity of work can-
not be deprived of the human spirit. 
Grimaldi notes that to insist on the importance of the human spirit
in work implies an idea of “spiritual work”. When work is under-
stood as a form of mediation by which what was possible is brought
to existence in reality, a purely internal principle is rendered exter-
nal47; this process of externalization leads the individual to commu-
nicate with others, to go beyond his own singularity and enter into
a communion with all humankind, specifically through his contact
with the direct beneficiaries of his work. To cook a roast chicken, for
example, is an external act, to bring something new into existence
and to offer it to others. The ‘roast chicken’ –as a task– reflects who
the worker is: the time spent in preparation, culinary knowledge and
skills, a grandmother’s secret ingredient, etc. The same might be
said for any other task or form of work: teaching a class, attending
to the needs of a customer, governing a country, etc.
Grimaldi writes: “My work presupposes the general existence of a
cultural community, if not of humankind as whole… [In carrying
out a task] my interior disposition is to respond to the hopes, needs
and desires [of others], which I must [first] be able to understand
(and, above all, to share) if I am to satisfy them. (…) The life of
humanity may be said to go on through the pain, patience, perseve-
rance and innovative skill of each person in so far as each individual
takes on the whole history of humanity (its discoveries, technical
practices, its culture) in his work”48. In other words, the relationship
between work and humanity mirrors that between mother and child:
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as the child owes his education and culture to his mother, so all
human beings to the activity of work. Work is marked by a sense of
creativity and gift to the degree that it is done as a service in respon-
se to the needs of others; work is a creative act of the worker when
his capacity to carry out work well done is put at the service of others.
Work reflects the nature of the worker, just as an art-work reflects
and reveals the artist. Work can perfect our nature because it provi-
des us with an opportunity to practise virtue.
Work also opens the worker to all those who may benefit from his
work; to attend to them, to serve their needs, is the primary and
essential way of taking care of others. The greatest form of work is
disinterested work; thus, the existential task of human being must
encompass the activity of work: the individual shapes the narrative
of his existence by going beyond himself, orienting his life in line
with noble and absolute ends. The absolute is the only truly funda-
mental need; God and man are the two absolutes. The absolute is con-
templated from within; the external demands made on the individual,
which draw him out of himself, can only be received, made his own
and attended to from the spirit, mediating between the interior and
the external, and not merely by taking care of what is immediately
present and pressing. 
Time spent at work is personal time because it is part of the existen-
tial task that encompasses the fundamental need of human life: the
absolute nature of the worker and of the beneficiaries of his labour.
Once the union of action and contemplation in the activity of work
is understood, work may be carried out in an idle way, as the subjec-
tive experience of the task includes an awareness of the presence of the
absolute; this point holds true, too, for manual labour. 
To shape one’s own life is an ethical project, a good purpose that we
may freely choose to pursue. If work is part of this project, as has
been argued above, then work too must be governed by ethical
values. The question remains as to how the ethics of work might be
framed. 
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The use of technical skills produces more or less immediate quanti-
fiable results; but no technical method can be neutral or indifferent,
least of all in the field of professional activity where the narrative of
human existence is primarily shaped. The technical must be groun-
ded in an ethical context that gives work real substance and huma-
nizes it. The ethical, unlike the technical, is a long-term project; it
defers to what is given and to what is not yet given –that is, what man
acts on and designs and invents from in order to carry out what is
good. Technical practices save only time and effort; they do not
necessarily humanize work. Ethics, in contrast, encompasses the
whole of human life: the organization of what should be saved and
spent, the investment of time, and putting into practice what is good
–that is, the practise of virtue. 
Work is made ethically real by virtue of the difficulties that are
encountered in the process; difficulties disrupt the pattern of routine
knowledge and response and prompt the spirit to come up with new
solutions. Ethics is the long-term result of this experience; it draws
on the confidence that the individual places in his ability to improve
in spiritual terms and to correct past action. Ethics is not synony-
mous with success, but with correction and improvement49. When
work forms part of the shaping of personal existence and defers to
an awareness of the presence of the absolute, situations are foreseen,
solutions planned, and responsibility taken. Foresight, planning and
responsibility are basic principles of a long-term project, and thus
elements of ethics.
If the ethical project is characterized by correction based on the use
of right reason, then the existence of a margin of error or failure
must be acknowledged. No work can be carried out well without
some deference to the ethical, less still by ignoring ethics altogether.
Man, on the other hand, may fail to give the ethical the attention it
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is due. The human capacity for failure and to mend one’s way is con-
tinuously tested through work, but it requires the active presence
and awareness of the spirit. Work is not framed solely in terms of
self-interest and material reward; it is structured from the perspec-
tive of the spirit, which draws together personal interests and the
interests of others, and the spiritual reward of human perfection. 
To speak of ethics is to speak of virtue, and in this way now for
virtue consists of doing what is good and is a way of saving time.
The virtuous man is lord and master of his activity because virtue
tunes human tendencies towards their proper ends and enables the
individual to take possession of them. Virtue, therefore, is an habit.
The time saved by habitual behaviour discloses that every action
contains a past, present and future: past, because habits develop on
the basis of repeated actions that have been done before and become
part of the individual’s way of being; present, because habits predis-
pose us towards new actions in the here and now; and future,
because the potential to continue doing what is good is always open
and real.
The past is always present as a necessary given: in general, the indi-
vidual acts on the basis of what has been learnt from past experience.
The ontological significance of the past is that it is what is given;
thus, if human nature is a given, to bind oneself to it constitutes the
best possible way of responding in an ethically real sense to the
situations that may arise in life –in the present and the future. To
bind oneself to human nature in this way is to commit to a dynamic,
not a static, project: nature is a dynamic principle of action, which
can be perfected through action. But it is to go away from Smith.
The rejection of any idea of a fixed, ontologically-real past –the past
as a given– is characteristic of a great deal of modern thought;
human activity, it is argued, takes place in the present moment,
without any reference to what has gone before. This position
involves abandoning the only stable ground on which the narrative
of existence might be shaped, even in spite of the risk of failure. In
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other words, only if there is some truly stable given past can man be
ethical, formulating and re-formulating new plans for the future on
the basis of present  action, in spite of and, indeed, often because of
failure.  
Contemporary society is often forgetful of the past; free time is seen
as an occasion for entertainment and distraction, rather than con-
templation. Real self-knowledge is almost impossible without some
awareness of the past; without this awareness, the attitude of the
individual tends to be one of absolute self-reliance. In contrast, the
response to the past as what is given, what is received, comprises
gratitude, a sense of indebtedness and responsibility. Two extreme
reactions may be prompted by the idea that there is no past, that
only the present is: a radical self-sufficiency that derives from the joy
of early success, or deep sorrow at the experience of failure. If only
the present truly is, the weight of action falls wholly on the indivi-
dual’s shoulders; sooner or later, so absolute a sense of self-suffi-
ciency will have to defer to the remedies of self-esteem because an eter-
nal present, the absence of the past, radically isolates the self from
all others. 
The individual is drawn out of himself only through his regard for
the absolute reality of the other50, a shift in attitude which deprives
self-interest of its pre-eminent status as the driving force of human
activity, allows the worker to humanize himself through his work,
and contributes to the material and spiritual wealth of nations.
Granted, I have gone beyond Smithian methodology and psycholo-
gy, but this reworking of his ideas was a viable possibility, one
opened up by Smith’s own principles. This possibility is what I have
sought to investigate in the final section of this paper. 
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